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_________________ 
DEBATE 
_________________ 
THE GREAT DIVORCE:  THE CURRENT UNDERSTANDING  
OF SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE ORIGINAL  
MEANING OF THE INCOMPATIBILITY CLAUSE 
In this lively Debate, Seth Barrett Tillman and Professor Steven 
Calabresi consider the possibility of a joint senate-presidential office-
holding.   Tillman makes the bold assertion that there is no constitu-
tional bar to President-elect Obama retaining his Senate seat.  Though 
the President-elect has, in fact, relinquished his seat in the Senate, 
Tillman argues that this debate is about more than incompatible of-
fice-holdings because “it also has clear implications for our under-
standing of the reach of” several related constitutional provisions.  
Treating the text formalistically, Tillman carefully parses the Constitu-
tion’s Incompatibility Clause (which restricts a member of either 
house of Congress from “holding any Office under the United 
States”), other related clauses, and the meaning of the words “officer” 
and “office,” to reach the conclusion that the presidency is not “an Of-
fice under the United States.”  Thus, Tillman maintains, the Incom-
patibility Clause poses no bar to a joint office-holding. 
Citing other constitutional provisions that are understood to refer 
to the President as an “officer” of the United States (such as the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause), Professor Calabresi counters that Tillman 
has “made an ingenious argument for an utterly implausible proposi-
tion” that “is contrary to the plain meaning of the constitutional text 
and to the way we have done things for eight hundred years.”  
Calabresi argues that, under an originalist reading, the terms “office” 
and “officer” should be read according to “what the ordinary citizen 
on the street would have thought words meant.”  Because Tillman’s 
reading is “too subtle by half,” Calabresi asserts that it would create “a 
bizarre conflict of interest—a conflict of interest unprecedented in 
the last eight hundred years.” 
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OPENING STATEMENT 
Why President-Elect Obama May Keep His Senate Seat  
After Assuming the Presidency 
Seth Barrett Tillman† 
If there was any doubt before, there can be no doubt now, post-
Heller, we are all originalists now—at least those of us who wish to re-
main relevant and within the mainstream of our ever-evolving judicial 
culture.  Originalism—as I conceive it—is about connecting the issues 
posed by today’s controversies to our historical and textual constitu-
tional past.  What that “past” says is, of course, highly contested.  In 
the next few pages I will argue that our modern understanding of 
separation of powers is not connected to 1787-–1789.  (Rather, it was 
an invention of commentators and jurists at the beginning of the Era 
of Good Feeling.)  Today, for example, any number of influential 
modern commentators (i.e., Akhil Reed Amar, Vikram David Amar, 
John C. Harrison, John F. Manning, and my interlocutor here, Steven 
G. Calabresi) have written that the Constitution’s Incompatibility 
Clause precludes joint senate-presidential office-holding.  That is 
wrong—at least, as a matter of original public meaning.  Rather, the 
Incompatibility Clause precludes a Senator from holding an office 
subject to the President’s appointment (and removal) power, but not 
from being President.  See Hanah Metchis Volokh, The Two Appoint-
ments Clauses:  Statutory Qualifications for Federal Officers, 10 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 745, 779 (2008) (“The Incompatibility Clause sets a limit 
both on membership in Congress and on holding an appointed of-
fice—namely, that the same person cannot do both at the same time.” 
(emphasis added)).  With the inauguration in only a few days, the 
question is unusually relevant, and the intellectual stakes here are po-
tentially quite high.  The debate here is about incompatible office-
holding, but it is about more than that.  It also has clear implications 
for our understanding of the reach of related constitutional provi-
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sions, including:  the Impeachment Clause, the Commissions Clause, 
the Appointments Clause, the Foreign Emoluments Clause, the Presi-
dential Compensation Clause, the Elector Incompatibility Clause, and 
the Succession Clause—all of which use language similar to that of the 
Incompatibility Clause.  But at a higher level of generality, this is really 
a debate about America’s (constitutional and intellectual) past and 
who owns it:  the modern purposivists or more traditional formalists—
and where the intellectual loyalties of self-styled (left, right, and cen-
ter) originalists really do lie. 
Let’s start with the text.  Article I, Section 6, Clause 2 provides: 
[The Ineligibility Clause :]  No Senator or Representative shall, 
during the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any 
civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which 
shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall 
have been encreased during such time; and 
[The Incompatibility Clause :]  [N]o Person holding any Office 
under the United States, shall be a Member of either House 
during his Continuance in Office. 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (emphasis added).  As for the Ineligibility 
Clause, it simply does not apply to President-elect Obama.  First, the 
office of President was not created during the Senator’s current term.  
It was created circa 1788-–1789.  Second, the emoluments have not 
been raised since 2001, that is, a time prior to the start of Senator 
Obama’s current term.  And, third, the Ineligibility Clause only pre-
cludes a Senator from holding “appointed” office; Presidents, by con-
trast, are “elected” or “chosen,” not “appointed.”  See U.S. CONST. 
art. II, § 1, cls. 1, 3; id. amend. XII.  If you think the latter is a distinc-
tion without a difference, that might be because our judicial and law 
school culture has miseducated the largest swathe of our citizens to 
undervalue democratic institutions and the very language of democ-
ratic culture.  Compare, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (distinguishing 
“elected” members from “appointed” officers), with Steven G. 
Calabresi & Joan L. Larsen, One Person, One Office:  Separation of Powers 
or Separation of Personnel?, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1083 (1994) (list-
ing President George Bush and Vice President Al Gore as persons “re-
cently appointed to executive . . . offices”), and Richard D. Friedman, 
Some Modest Proposals on the Vice-Presidency, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1703, 1720 
n.72 (1988) (“Probably not much weight should be put on the term 
‘appointment’ . . . .”). 
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Whether the Incompatibility Clause precludes joint legislative-
presidential office-holding is a closer question.  Simply put, if the 
presidency is an “Office under the United States,” then joint senate-
presidential office-holding is precluded, but if the presidency is not an 
“Office under the United States,” then there is no (express) prohibi-
tion against such joint office-holding, and President Obama may keep 
his Senate seat. 
Here, because of space considerations, I am going to touch upon 
only three clauses to make the case that the presidency is not an “Of-
fice under the United States.”  However, I maintain that the view pre-
sented here is consistent with each and every other clause of the Con-
stitution of 1787. 
The Impeachment Clause.  Article II, Section 4 provides:  “The Presi-
dent, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be re-
moved from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, 
Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.” U.S. CONST. art. II, 
§ 4 (emphasis added).  As Justice Story explained in his Commentaries, 
this clause does not say “all other civil Officers” of the United States.  2 
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 791 (1833).  Moreover, the word “other” was known to the 
Founders—it is used throughout the Constitution, and even in an-
other phrase in the Impeachment Clause itself.  If, as Professors Akhil 
Amar, Vikram Amar, and Steven Calabresi have suggested, i.e., the 
phrases “Officers of the United States” and “Officers under the United 
States” are coextensive, then the language of the Impeachment Clause 
suggests that the President and the Vice President are neither “Offi-
cers of the United States,” as used in the Impeachment Clause, nor 
“Office[rs] under the United States,” as that phrase is used in the In-
compatibility Clause.  See Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, Is 
the Presidential Succession Law Constitutional?, 48 STAN. L. REV. 113, 114-
15 (1995) (“As a textual matter, each of these five formulations seem-
ingly describes the same stations (apart from the civil/military distinc-
tion)—the modifying terms ‘of,’ ‘under,’ and ‘under the Authority of’ 
are essentially synonymous.”); Calabresi & Larsen, One Person, One Of-
fice, supra, at 1062-63 (noting that the Incompatibility Clause refers to 
“Office under the United States,” but stating that it “impos[es] a dis-
ability on ‘Officers of the United States’”); cf. Steven G. Calabresi, The 
Political Question of Presidential Succession, 48 STAN. L. REV. 155, 160 
(1995) (“The Constitution does not contemplate a weird [! ] distinc-
tion between ‘Officers of the United States’ [as used in the Appoint-
ments Clause] and ‘Officers of the Government of the United States’ 
[as used in the Necessary and Proper Clause].”). 
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Furthermore, when one stops to consider that in early drafts of 
the Impeachment Clause the word “other” immediately preceded 
“civil Officers,” but it was taken out by the Committee of Style, then 
the absence of the word “other” from the final draft does not appear 
to be accidental or happenstance.  Rather it appears to be a distinct 
choice. 
The Commissions Clause.  Article II, Section 3 provides:  “[The Presi-
dent] . . . shall Commission all the Officers of the United States.”  U.S. 
CONST. art. II, § 3 (emphasis added).  All means all.  If the President 
were an officer of the United States, then President George Washing-
ton should have self-commissioned, and Presidents starting with John 
Adams should have received commissions from their predecessors.  
Simply put, that is not the practice and has never been the practice.  
Nor does there appear to be any eighteenth-century discussion sug-
gesting that it should be the practice. 
Again, if the term “Officers of the United States” is coextensive 
with “Officers under the United States,” as suggested by modern 
commentators including the Amars and Professor Calabresi, then it 
(again) seems to follow that the Incompatibility Clause does not apply 
to the President. 
The Foreign Emoluments Clause.  “[N]o Person holding any Office of 
Profit or Trust under the[] [United States], shall, without the Consent 
of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of 
any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.”  U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (emphasis added).  The “under the United 
States” language here closely tracks the “under the United States” lan-
guage of the Incompatibility Clause.  And modern commentators have 
held that this clause applies to the presidency (notwithstanding the 
presence of a wholly separate emoluments clause applying exclusively 
to the President).  See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITU-
TION:  A BIOGRAPHY 182 (2005) (“[T]he more general language of Ar-
ticle I, section 9 barred all federal officers, from the President on 
down, from accepting any ‘present’ or ‘Emolument’ of ‘any kind 
whatever’ from a foreign government without special congressional 
consent.”). 
However, in 1790, the Marquis de Lafayette, an officer of the 
French revolutionary government, sent President George Washington 
a gift:  the main key to the Bastille.  There is no record of Washington 
ever having asked for Congress’s consent to keep the gift.  Why?  One 
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possibility is that Washington considered the gift to be a personal gift 
from Lafayette, his adopted son in all but law.  But even if that were 
the case, Washington was very sensitive in matters relating to proce-
dural regularity and appearance.  And after all, surely Congress would 
have consented had Washington asked.  Moreover, even if he consid-
ered it a personal gift, others, including his political opponents, may 
not have.  Where is there a record of a complaint lodged against the 
President in a House floor speech or in a popular pamphlet? 
The better view, I believe, is that Washington never asked for 
Congress’s consent because he never thought that he, the elected 
Chief Magistrate, the holder of an Article VI public trust, could be 
confused with a mere creature, an officer under the United States 
(i.e., a statutory or appointed officer).  He never asked for Congress’s 
consent because he never imagined that he was an officer under the 
United States.  It seems Washington once expressed such a view:  “The 
impossibility that one man should be able to perform all the great 
business of the State, I take to have been the reason for instituting the 
great Departments, and appointing officers therein, to assist the su-
preme Magistrate in discharging the duties of his trust.”  Letter from 
George Washington to Eléonor François Élie, Comte de Moustier 
(May 25, 1789), in 30 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 333, 
334 ( John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1939) (emphasis added).  “Trust,” not 
“office.”  Interestingly, it appears that James Madison was aware of the 
difficulty of properly categorizing the President (or, at least, an acting 
President) as an officer or as a trustee.  Madison was aware of the dif-
ficulty, but he took no concrete position (which for a careful man—
and a nonlawyer at that—is probably not surprising).  Madison wrote 
that statutory presidential succession is “an annexation of one office or 
trust to another office.”  Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pen-
dleton (Feb. 21, 1792), in 14 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 235, 236 
(Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1983) (emphasis added).  Madison 
aside, the distinction between an “office” and a “public trust” is one 
which is grounded in the very text of Article VI and is even discussed, 
in passing, in The Federalist.  See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (distinguish-
ing an “office” under the United States from holders of “public 
trust[s] under the United States”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 376 
(Alexander Hamilton) ( J.R. Pole ed., 2005) (“If it be a public trust or 
office in which they are clothed with equal dignity and authority, there 
is peculiar danger of personal emulation and even animosity.” (em-
phasis added)) . 
Simply put, Washington’s response (or, perhaps more accurately, 
his and his contemporaries’ nonresponse) to receiving the key to the 
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Bastille indicates that the President is not an “Office[r] . . . under the 
United States,” as that phrase is used in the Foreign Emoluments 
Clause, and, therefore, it seems to follow that the Incompatibility 
Clause, using (nearly) identical operative words, has no application to 
Presidents.  And as I indicated above, I could advance similar hyper-
formalistic arguments (i.e., hyperformalistic by modern standards) 
with regard to each and every other clause of the Constitution of 1787  
that also use the language of office and officer. 
Thus, it seems to follow that the Incompatibility Clause poses no 
bar against joint senate-presidential office-holding. 
2008] The Great Divorce 141 
REBUTTAL 
Does the Incompatibility Clause Apply to the President? 
Steven G. Calabresi† 
Seth Barrett Tillman has made an ingenious argument for an ut-
terly implausible proposition.  He claims that Presidents of the United 
States can serve simultaneously in Congress as senators or representa-
tives.  As a result, Tillman claims Senator Obama need not resign his 
senate seat after he becomes President.  Tillman is wrong, but he is 
wrong in the enlightening sort of way that suggests he ought to be a 
law professor.  The problem for Tillman is the Incompatibility Clause 
of Article I, Section 6, Clause 2.  This Clause provides that “no person 
holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of ei-
ther House during his Continuance in Office.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, 
cl. 2.  Tillman argues that the presidency is not included in the words 
“any Office under the United States.”  He thinks that the President is a 
trustee rather than an officer as is implied by occasional references of 
the framers to the President as being the nation’s Chief Magistrate. 
Discussion of the original public meaning of the Incompatibility 
Clause starts with the word “any.”  The word “any” is used at least 
twenty-eight times in the original Constitution, another twenty-two 
times in the twenty-seven amendments to the Constitution, and it is 
thus used for a grand total of at least fifty times in the amended docu-
ment as it currently stands.  The word “any” means “any,” not “some 
of.”  It is always used in the amended Constitution as a synonym for 
the word “every,” and all the dictionaries old and new I have consulted 
give it that meaning.  Consider two examples beyond the Incompati-
bility Clause’s ban on congressional membership for those holding 
“any Office.”  The Supremacy Clause of Article VI makes federal law 
supreme, “any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the 
Contrary notwithstanding.”  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (emphasis 
added).  “Any” certainly means “every” here.  Likewise the Due Proc-
ess and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment for-
bid deprivations of due process or equal protection to “any” person 
with “any” again plainly being a synonym for “every.” 
 
† George C. Dix Professor of Constitutional Law, Northwestern University School of 
Law. 
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How about the original public meaning of the word “office”?  Is 
the presidency an “office” or a “trust” as those words are used in the 
amended Constitution?  The answer is that it is clearly an office.  Arti-
cle I, Section 3, Clause 5 thus says “[t]he Senate shall chuse their 
other Officers, and also a President pro tempore, in the Absence of 
the Vice President, or when he shall exercise the Office of President of the 
United States.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 5 (emphasis added).  The 
Presidential Oath Clause says that new Presidents must swear to “faith-
fully execute the Office of President of the United States.”  U.S. CONST. art. 
II, § 1, cl. 8 (emphasis added).  The Twenty-Second Amendment for-
bids citizens from being elected more than twice to “the office of Presi-
dent.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XXII, § 1 (emphasis added).  And, finally 
for good measure, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment provides for tempo-
rary acting Presidents whenever the President is unable to discharge 
the “duties of his office.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, §§ 3-4 (emphasis 
added).  In contrast to the Constitution’s four references to the presi-
dency as an office, it is not once described as being a trust. 
Undeterred by this daunting evidence of original public meaning, 
Mr. Tillman argues that, while the presidency is an office, the Presi-
dent is not an officer “under the United States.”  Since the Incom-
patibility Clause applies only to “Offices under the United States,” it 
does not, according to Tillman, apply to the President or Vice Presi-
dent. 
To begin with, the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I, Sec-
tion 8, Clause 18 refers to the President and to all other federal execu-
tive and judicial figures as “Officers” of the “Government of the 
United States.”  Everyone for 219 years has thought that the Necessary 
and Proper Clause uses these words to refer to the President.  
Tillman’s argument thus comes down to the incredibly subtle claim 
that the phrase officer “under” the United States, in the Incompatibil-
ity Clause, means something different from the phrase officer “of the 
Government of the United States” in the Necessary and Proper 
Clause.  This is highly implausible because no reasonable Framer 
could possibly have expected the public to perceive different mean-
ings based on such subtle changes of wording.  Is the presidency not 
an Office “under the United States?”  Of course it is.  The United 
States is represented in the Constitution by the sovereign “We the 
People.”  The presidency is as much an office “under” the power of 
We the People as are judgeships or the Chief Justiceship.  Thus when 
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the Oath Clause of Article VI requires that all federal and state execu-
tive and judicial officers take oaths to uphold the Constitution the 
Clause is clearly referring to the President, the Vice President and to 
state governors as well as to all federal and state judges.  There is no 
sense here that Presidents, Vice Presidents, or governors are trustees 
and not officers in the way the words are used. 
But, says Tillman, phrases such as “Office under the United 
States” and “Officer of the United States” are legal terms of art in the 
document with specialized meaning, just as the phrase “ex post facto 
law” is a legal term of art that refers only to retroactive criminal laws 
and not to retroactive civil laws.  This is the case even though in Latin 
the phrase would appear to refer to both as a matter of plain mean-
ing. 
Tillman is right about the Ex Post Facto Laws Clauses being a legal 
term of art with a specialized meaning because those words had their 
origins in the English Bill of Rights of 1689 and were so described in 
Blackstone’s Commentaries.  By the time the Constitution was written 
and ratified, the phrase “ex post facto law” had indeed acquired a spe-
cialized and distinctive meaning.  Nothing of the sort can be said as to 
“Office under the United States,” a term unmentioned in the English 
Bill of Rights or by Blackstone.  Its original meaning quite obviously 
depends on the original meaning of “office,” of “under,” and of “the 
United States.”  We have already seen that the Constitution repeatedly 
describes the presidency as an office.  And, it is just as obvious that the 
presidency, which is created and given its powers in Article II, is “un-
der the United States,” the People of which create the Constitution in 
the Preamble.  It may well be that the King of England in 1789 was not 
an officer “under” the kingdom of Great Britain, but the President is 
most certainly an officer under the United States, the people of which 
are sovereign. 
But, one might ask what the general practice was in 1787 as to 
kings or colonial governors serving in the legislature?  Was it com-
monplace for kings or colonial governors to serve simultaneously in 
the legislature?  Absolutely not!  The whole point of the two houses of 
the British Parliament was to give the Lords temporal and spiritual a 
place in the House of Lords and the commoners their own distinct 
house—the House of Commons.  It was said that when these two 
houses took action, together with the King in Parliament, the law 
could be changed.  Implicit in this is the idea that Kings could not by 
definition be members of Parliament.  If they were, they would have 
been parlaying or talking to themselves.  Likewise, colonial governors, 
although advised by executive councils, did not sit as members of co-
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lonial legislatures.  The office of governor was distinct and separate 
from, for example, the office of a member of the House of Burgesses.  
Practice under the U.S. Constitution has never allowed sitting mem-
bers of Congress to serve in the presidency.  No one has ever before in 
219 years held the presidency while serving as a member of Congress, 
and the two sitting senators elected to the presidency, Warren G. 
Harding and John F. Kennedy, both resigned their senate seats upon 
becoming President. 
Original public meaning and consistent Anglo-American practice 
suggests that Tillman is wrong about the meaning of the phrase “Of-
fice under the United States.”  What then of the three clauses he relies 
on to conclude most illogically that the presidency is not an “Office 
under the United States?” 
Tillman makes much of the fact that the Impeachment Clause of 
Article II, Section 4 applies to “the President, Vice President and all 
civil officers of the United States.”  He notes that the Committee of 
Style took the word “other” out of earlier drafts of this clause, and 
Tillman argues this was a deliberate attempt by the framers to show 
that the President was not a civil officer of the United States.  
Tillman’s argument fails for several reasons.  First, the omission of the 
word “other” could easily have been made, and probably was made, 
for the reason that it was redundant.  Since the Constitution twice re-
ferred to the presidency as an “office,” there was simply no need here 
to repeat that the President was a civil officer of the United States.  
The idea that the framers, by this very subtle omission, meant to allow 
Presidents to serve simultaneously as members of Congress strains 
credulity.  And this is leaving aside the fact that we know of the omis-
sion only from notes of the Convention that were not published until 
long after the Constitution had gone into effect and that were not sup-
posed to have any legal effect.  Tillman’s argument here is from a se-
cret legislative history that does not bear at all on the original public 
meaning of the constitutional text. 
Tillman next makes much of the Commissions Clause of Article II, 
Section 3, which says the President “shall” (i.e., “must”) commission 
“all the Officers of the United States.”  Tillman notes here that Wash-
ington did not commission himself, his Vice President, or his succes-
sor and that, in fact, no President or Vice President has ever received 
a commission.  From this, Tillman infers that Presidents and Vice 
Presidents are not officers of the United States.  This is Tillman’s best 
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argument.  The verb commission has long been used to refer to a 
document that empowers some official to act. 
Washington himself set our practice on this by taking his oath of 
office at a formal inauguration ceremony in front of members of 
Congress and of the general public, but it is true that he did not 
commission himself, his Vice President, or his successor.  The most 
likely explanation is that English monarchs, on whom the presidency 
is partially modeled, issued commissions to those whom they ap-
pointed but not to themselves or their Princes of Wales.  Our practice 
of not commissioning Presidents and Vice Presidents is thus a func-
tion of the fact that, like Kings, they take office in a public ceremony 
with elements of a coronation, and there is a magic moment when the 
powers of office become invested in them which is when they take the 
oath of office.  There is simply no need for a signed commission to 
prove that Presidents and Vice Presidents have been invested with 
power while there is often such a need as to lesser officials.  Washing-
ton’s failure to commission thus looks far more like an understand-
able oversight on his part than it does like a deliberate decision in fa-
vor of the highly implausible conclusion that Presidents and Vice 
Presidents are not officers of the United States.  Tillman’s argument 
on the Commission Clause is 100% an argument from practice, and it 
is defeated by the observation that there is an eight-hundred-year-long 
Anglo-American practice of Kings and Presidents never ever sitting si-
multaneously as members of Parliament or Congress.  His argument 
as to the Foreign Emoluments Clause is foreclosed for the same rea-
sons. 
The question whether a President is an officer or a trustee is easily 
answered by looking at Article II, Sections 1, 2, and 3.  The President 
is plainly the chief executive officer of our government and not the 
chairman of its board of directors.  The conclusion that one could si-
multaneously represent and respond to the people of a congressional 
district or state and to the people of the nation as a whole is more 
than just counterintuitive.  It is contrary to the plain meaning of the 
constitutional text and to the way we have done things for eight hun-
dred years. 
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CLOSING STATEMENT 
An “Utterly Implausible” Interpretation of the Constitution 
Seth Barrett Tillman 
When I was in law school, I saw able academics bob and weave, re-
jecting outliers, distinguishing counterauthority, attempting to tie dis-
parate authorities into a coherent whole.  It was very entertaining, and 
I recognize that to do it well requires great intellectual dexterity.  But 
it is a skill that serves a limited purpose.  When divided political insti-
tutions interpret a fixed multi-article document over many years, dis-
parate and rival officials will naturally come to different conclusions as 
to contested meaning.  When predicting how adjudicators will decide 
an unsettled question in the future, one naturally draws on all sources 
of authority.  Legal academics train students to make such predictions 
and to shape decision makers’ decisions.  Bobbing and weaving is a 
necessary skill coextensive with legal practice.  But abstract inquiry 
into original public meaning is substantially different.  Here, bobbing 
and weaving a lot is a strong indication that you do not have a coher-
ent theory, a theory with bottom.  Professor Calabresi’s response—as I 
intend to show—is all bobbing and weaving.  His view is a universe of 
epicycles and unfalsifiable hypotheses.  In choosing between his view 
and my own, the reader should watch for this:  Who is saying the 
Founders were reasonably competent legal draftspersons, and who is 
saying they were unaccountably sloppy?  Who is making exceptionally 
subtle distinctions—the person arguing that disparate language raises 
an inference of disparate meaning or the person arguing that differ-
ent language has identical meaning?  Who puts forward positions that 
are capable of validation and falsification, and who claims that he is 
correct in spite of uncontested presidential, vice presidential, and 
senate practice from 1789 contradicting his position? 
Here, I briefly restate and hopefully clarify my position:  as a tex-
tual matter, the Incompatibility Clause applies to any offices under the 
United States.  My view is that this category does not encompass the 
President and Vice President.  There are two conventions in regard to 
the use of “office” and “officer.”  It is difficult to get people to see this; 
it is something like explaining the meaning of “is” or “the.”  When 
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one is outside a hierarchical relationship, all the persons inside the 
relationship are equally officers.  From the point of view of citizens 
(i.e., “We the People”), the President and his subordinates all equally 
hold office; they are all equally officers.  But for those inside the hier-
archy or describing it, the convention is somewhat different.  In that 
situation, only the subordinates are called officers, and the person or 
persons at the apex of authority are given some other title:  board 
members, trustees, chief magistrates, members of Congress.  The Con-
stitution uses both conventions.  When it varies from one convention 
to the other, it varies its language.  The Succession Clause, for exam-
ple, using “officer” unmodified, makes use of the outside convention.  
The Impeachment Clause (using “Officer of the United States” lan-
guage), the Commissions Clause, the Religious Test Clause, and the 
Incompatibility Clause use the inside view.  When the Incompatibility 
Clause textually precludes members of Congress from being officers 
under the United States, it means that members are precluded from 
taking statutory or appointed office—not from being the President, and 
not from holding elected office at the apex of Executive Branch author-
ity.  See, e.g., Letter from George Washington to Eléonor François Élie, 
Comte de Moustier (May 25, 1789), in 30 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE 
WASHINGTON 333, 334 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1939) (“The impossi-
bility that one man should be able to perform all the great business of 
State, I take to have been the reason for instituting the great Depart-
ments, and appointing officers therein, to assist the supreme Magistrate 
in discharging the duties of his trust.” (emphasis added)).  “Officers,” 
not “other officers”; “Magistrate,” not “officer”; “trust,” not “office.”  
See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to 
Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 637 (1994) (quoting from the same 
passage of the Washington-to-Élie letter); Steven G. Calabresi & Chris-
topher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the First Half-Century, 47 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1451, 1475-76 (1997) (same).  Even modern aca-
demics write this way.  Professor Saikrishna Prakash writes that the 
Appointments Clause “establish[es] the requirement of senate con-
firmation for all officers, but permitting Congress, by law, to vest the 
appointment of inferior officers with the President, heads of depart-
ments, and courts.”  Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Deviant Executive 
Lawmaking, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 41 n.224 (1998) (emphasis 
added).  Everyone understands what Prakash and Washington meant; 
in this context, “officers”—yes, even “all officers”—refers to those ap-
pointed by the President, but not to the President.  Thus, notwith-
standing Professor Calabresi’s view that the “any office” language of 
the Incompatibility Clause must refer to the presidency, such lan-
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guage frequently does not include the presidency.  To determine what 
convention was being used in a particular constitutional clause, one 
looks to context, and to what people did when faced with this lan-
guage—which after some 219 years is ambiguous to us, but perhaps 
was not to them. 
Calabresi’s Constitutional Concatenation.  Professor Calabresi and I 
agree that the Incompatibility Clause precludes members of either 
House from holding any office under the United States.  To make out 
his argument that the latter phrase extends to the presidency, he can 
point to no language expressly describing the President as an “officer 
of the United States” or an “officer under the United States,” nor to 
any language describing the presidency as an “office of the United 
States” or an “office under the United States.”  Rather, he points to 
language describing the presidency as an “office,” and he could have 
also pointed to language describing the President as “hold[ing] his 
office.”  See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.  As to “under the United 
States,” he argues that that language is implied because the presi-
dency, as all officers created by the Constitution, are under “We the 
People.”  This latter constitutional just-so story makes pleasant read-
ing, but it also makes gibberish of the actual text of the Constitution. 
For example, the Speaker is described as an “officer.”  Does the 
Speaker have an “office”?  The answer is clearly yes:  “‘Officer’ is in-
separably connected with ‘office,’ and there can be no officer without 
an office.”  67 C.J.S. Officers and Public Employees § 1 (2002) (footnotes 
omitted).  (The reverse is not equally true:  it is possible—at times—to 
have or hold office, but not be an officer :  trustees, directors, and those 
at the apex of a chain of legal authority hold office (i.e., Chief Magis-
trates), but they are not at all times and for all purposes officers.)  
Like the President, the Speaker is nowhere described as holding an 
office under the United States, but he is described as an officer of the 
House of Representatives of the Congress of the United States.  If the 
President holds an office under the United States because he holds 
federal office and works for “We the People,” then the Speaker by the 
same reasoning holds an office under the United States too.  On 
Calabresi’s reading, both the Speaker and the President hold an office 
under the United States; i.e., both work for “We the People,” and both 
offices are expressly created by the Constitution.  That reading—
Calabresi’s reading—of the key disputed language within the Incom-
patibility Clause would exclude members of Congress from the presi-
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dency, but it would also equally exclude House members from the 
speakership.  That result is contradicted by uniform Anglo-American 
practice and that indicates that the meaning of “office under the 
United States” cannot be determined by concatenating the separate 
meanings of “office” and “under” and “the United States.”  The alter-
native view is that “office under the United States” is a term of art.  
Professor Calabresi chides me for this position by noting that “office 
under the United States”—unlike the phrase “ex post facto”—does 
not appear in Blackstone or in the English Bill of Rights of 1689.  So 
what?  Even he has acknowledged that “Officer of the United States” is 
a “term of art.”  Steven G. Calabresi, The Political Question of Presidential 
Succession, 48 STAN. L. REV. 155, 161 (1995).  And “officer of the 
United States” does not appear in Blackstone or in the English Bill of 
Rights either (and how could it given the underlying dates involved!).  
If “officer of the United States” can be a term of art, surely so can “of-
fice under the United States.”  Any other result cuts against Calabresi’s 
newly discovered canon against constitutional subtlety. 
The Oaths and Affirmations Clause.  Professor Calabresi affirms that 
“when the Oath Clause of Article VI requires that all federal and state 
executive and judicial officers take oaths to uphold the Constitution the 
Clause is clearly referring to the President, the Vice President and to state 
governors”  (emphasis added).  Not only is that result not clear, it is 
entirely wrong.  See Motions Sys. Corp. v. Bush, 437 F.3d 1356, 1372 
n.9 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Gajarsa, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the en banc judgment) (arguing that the President’s separate Article 
II Oath suggests that the President is “not among the ‘executive offi-
cers’ governed by Article VI, clause 3”).  First, it is because the Arti-
cle VI oath reaches federal executive officers (i.e., officers appointed 
to statutory offices) that the Constitution had to provide the President 
with his own free-standing Article II oath.  Furthermore, the statutory 
oath imposed by the first statute of the first Congress applied to the 
Vice President, but not as an executive branch officer.  Rather, the 
statute compelled the Vice President to take the oath in his role as 
President of the Senate.  Textually, the Oaths Clause applies to sena-
tors and representatives and to federal executive officers, not to the 
President of the Senate, who is neither a member nor senator.  Yet, if 
the Vice President is so clearly a federal executive officer, as Professor 
Calabresi states, then why did the first Congress jump through all 
these unnecessary—if not downright constitutionally suspect—hoops?  
Perhaps they believed that the Vice President was not a federal execu-
tive officer?  Who better understood the Oaths Clause and the Consti-
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tution’s use of office and officer—Professor Calabresi or the first Con-
gress? 
The Impeachment Clause.  The Impeachment Clause applies to “The 
President, Vice President and all civil officers of the United States.”  U.S. 
CONST. art. II, § 4 (emphasis added).  Because the word “other” does 
not appear between “all” and “civil,” Justice Story argued that the 
President and Vice President were not officers of the United States.  
Judge Gajarsa and Professor Kalt have arrived at the same conclusion.  
I would argue that the Impeachment Clause is ambiguous.  Faced with 
ambiguous language, I turned to the Convention record.  I pointed 
out that the Clause initially made use of “other,” but it was dropped by 
the Committee of Style, and I concluded by noting that this sequence 
of events is consistent with Story’s position.  Professor Calabresi ac-
cuses me of erring by relying on the “secret legislative history” of the 
Federal Convention.  That is wrong.  My use of legislative history in 
this manner—turning to extrinsic evidence in the face of ambiguous 
text—is standard practice.  See Calabresi & Prakash, The President’s 
Power to Execute the Laws, supra, at 554 (“If the text standing alone 
would have been clear to an ordinary user of the language at the time 
of enactment, one cannot consult the legislative history to that text in 
order to create an ambiguity.”).  Nor did I use the legislative history to 
contradict the text.  Cf. id. (“Legislative history should be used only to 
clarify linguistic ambiguity by shedding light on which of several pos-
sible textual meanings was in fact the one that was ‘intended.’”).  It is 
important for the reader to understand Calabresi’s interpretive ma-
neuver.  If the only person disagreeing with Calabresi were Tillman, 
then he could say the text is clear (i.e., Tillman’s view is idiosyncratic), 
and, therefore, my turn to extrinsic evidence was illegitimate.  But the 
simple truth is, the text is not clear—the fact that Story, Gajarsa, and 
Kalt arrive at a position diametrically opposed to Professor Calabresi’s 
proves at least that much.  Calabresi’s problem is not with my use of 
legislative history, but with Story’s very “wooden” (i.e., Anglo-
American, traditional, eighteenth-century, literalistic) textualism.  
Original public meaning? 
Calabresi’s position is that “other” was dropped as “redundant.”  
That strains credulity.  Why?  In Calabresi’s view, the President and 
Vice President are obviously officers of the United States.  So if the 
drafters dropped “other” because it was redundant, why did they not 
go further (in the interest of avoiding redundancy) and also drop 
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“The President” and “Vice President?”  (Indeed such additional edit-
ing to the Impeachment Clause would have made it textually consis-
tent with the Commissions Clause.)  Furthermore, in his 1995 Stanford 
Law Review article, Professor Calabresi (and a cast of thousands) ar-
gued that “officer” and “officer of the United States” were coextensive 
on the theory that where the Constitution meant to include state offi-
cers, it did so expressly.  So in Calabresi’s view, “the President, Vice 
President, and all other civil officers of the United States” is coextensive 
with “the President, Vice President, and all civil officers of the United 
States” is coextensive with “all civil officers of the United States” is co-
extensive with “all civil officers.”  Yet Calabresi argues that in order to 
avoid redundancy, the Founders just dropped “other.”  So Calabresi’s 
position boils down to this—by dropping “other,” the Founders aimed 
to avoid redundancy, but they were too incompetent to actually 
achieve it. 
The Commissions Clause.  The Commissions Clause mandates that 
the President “shall commission all the officers of the United States.”  
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.  Here the Constitution used exactly the simple 
language the draftspersons failed to use in the Impeachment Clause.  
The Founders did not expressly include the President and Vice Presi-
dent.  Thus, in my childlike simplicity, I conclude this clause excludes 
the President and Vice President.  Professor Calabresi believes other-
wise.  Were Calabresi’s position correct, Presidents and Vice Presi-
dents should have been commissioned since 1789. 
What was the original practice, contemporaneous with ratifica-
tion?  No commissions.  How does Professor Calabresi explain the dis-
crepancy? 
Our practice of not commissioning Presidents and Vice Presidents is 
thus a function of the fact that, like Kings, they take office in a public 
ceremony with elements of coronation, and there is a magic moment 
when the powers of office become invested in them which is when they 
take the oath of office.  There is simply no need for a signed commis-
sion . . . .  Washington’s failure to commission thus looks far more like 
an understandable oversight . . . . 
Oversight?  Vice President Adams presided over the Senate for 
two months and authenticated Congress’s first statute—all prior to 
taking his Article VI oath.  If the “magic moment” of oath taking is an 
obvious substitute for an officer’s commission, then Washington 
should have issued Adams a commission promptly.  Why didn’t Adams 
complain in regard to its absence?  Why is there no record of any 
(anti-administration or anti-Adams) Senator—or anyone else in the 
United States—lodging a complaint about Washington’s oversight?  Is 
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it not far more reasonable to suggest that everyone believed that 
Presidents and Vice Presidents do not fall under the aegis of the 
Commissions Clause, and that Washington, Adams, and the first Sen-
ate acted correctly, but it is Professor Calabresi’s analysis which errs?  
First Justice Story, now Washington and Adams.  Exactly how much 
constitutional text and how many Founders will Professor Calabresi 
throw under the bus to accommodate his position?  How is it that he is 
so right, and they are all so wrong? 
Moreover, I really wonder how many PENNumbra readers will un-
derstand what sort of intellectual climbdown has taken place here.  
Professor Calabresi has argued in numerous scholarly articles that the 
Constitution’s use of “shall” (i.e., the verb in the Commissions Clause) 
is mandatory language and that the precedents of Washington’s ad-
ministration are constitutionally sound precedents, exemplars of the 
original public meaning of constitutional text.  Mandatory does not 
mean it is okey-dokey to skip obeying the command if you believe (in 
this case wrongly) on functional grounds that no purpose will be 
served by obedience to the text.  But if the Washington-
administration-era precedents are so unsound, if Calabresi is right and 
Washington was wrong, then what—if anything—is left of Professor 
Calabresi’s unitary executive thesis? 
Space considerations leave me unable to address the remainder of 
Professor Calabresi’s interesting counterarguments.  I sum up by not-
ing that I have argued that the President is neither an officer of the 
United States nor an officer under the United States.  If these two re-
lated claims are correct, then the Incompatibility Clause does not ap-
ply to the President.  Professor Calabresi is sure I am wrong; he chides 
me for attempting to interpret the placement of the word “govern-
ment” in the Sweeping Clause, the only clause discussing officers mak-
ing use of the phrase “Government of the United States.”  Am I the 
first to attempt to interpret obscure language?  Compare Calabresi & 
Prakash, The President’s Power, supra, at 567 (finding “no significance . . . 
[in the] slight variations in wording between [the Article I and Arti-
cle III] clauses that vest Congress with the power to create inferior 
courts to the Supreme Court” (emphasis added)), with Steven G. 
Calabresi & Gary S. Lawson, The Unitary Executive, Jurisdiction Stripping, 
and the Hamdan Opinions:  A Textualist Response to Justice Scalia, 107 
COLUM. L. REV. 1002, 1028-29 (2007) (distinguishing the same two 
clauses, and arguing that the Article I Tribunals Clause, unlike its Ar-
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ticle III counterpart, permits Congress to designate state courts infe-
rior to the Supreme Court).  He describes my (a/k/a Story’s) position 
as “utterly implausible,” by which he means, it was (prior to reading 
my paper) unknown to him and to his modern academic colleagues.  
But Professor Calabresi’s position was unknown to John Adams and to 
his eighteenth-century Senate colleagues.  To paraphrase the greatest 
constitutional scholar to hail from Illinois (himself relying on other, 
older Authority), better a live dog, than a dead lion. 
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CLOSING STATEMENT 
A Term of Art or the Artful Reading of Terms? 
Steven G. Calabresi 
Seth Barrett Tillman’s rebuttal claims that when the Incompatibil-
ity Clause says that “no Person holding any Office under the United 
States, shall be a Member of either House” of Congress it does not ap-
ply to the President.  Tillman’s position is that Presidents can serve 
simultaneously as members of Congress even though in eight hun-
dred years of English and American history no King, Queen, colonial 
governor, or President has ever served simultaneously in the legisla-
ture.  Tillman concedes that the word “any” as used in the Incompati-
bility Clause means “any,” that the presidency is an “office” as that 
term is used in the Clause, and that the Necessary and Proper Clause 
uses the words “officer” of “the Government of the United States” to 
describe the President, but he persists in denying that the presidency 
is an “office under the United States.”  He argues that the phrase “of-
fice under the United States” is a term of art, like the phrase “officer 
of the United States,” and that Justice Joseph Story was right when he 
said many years after the founding that the President was not an offi-
cer of the United States. 
Tillman’s argument is too subtle by half.  The questions a consti-
tutional interpreter must answer are:  first, what was the widely held 
original public meaning of the words in question; second, how have 
those words been understood over the course of our history; and 
third, what reading of the language leads to the most normatively 
plausible and thus, most likely, the intended result.  Of these ques-
tions, by far the most important is the first. 
The original public meaning of the constitutional text is the start-
ing point for constitutional analysis because it was the voters in the 
thirteen original states who elected the ratifying conventions who had 
the authority to make the Constitution law.  Voters and members of 
the ratifying conventions read the framers’ Constitution, and it was 
their shared public understanding of what the Constitution meant 
that led to its becoming law.  Original meaning is thus about what the 
ordinary citizen on the street would have thought words meant.  It is 
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not about the understanding of someone as erudite as Justice Story.  It 
must be presumed that ordinary citizens would have given words like 
“any,” “office,” or “officer” of “the government of the United States” 
their commonsense meaning of including the President of the United 
States.  It is highly unlikely that the American people in the 1780s 
would have understood the phrase “office under the United States” to 
be a specialized term of art that did not include the President not-
withstanding the plain public meaning of all of these other words.  
This is especially the case because for Tillman to be right, the Ameri-
can people would have to have thought that Presidents could serve 
simultaneously as members of Congress even though no King, Queen, 
or colonial governor has ever, to my knowledge, served simultaneously 
as a member of the legislature. 
Tillman claims the President, unlike the Chief Justice or Associate 
Justices of the Supreme Court, is not an officer “under the United 
States,” because the framers thought of him and sometimes described 
him in private correspondence as our “Chief Magistrate.”  Tillman 
thus postulates that the President has a different status from the jus-
tices of the Supreme Court such that the presidential office is not an 
“office under the United States.”  Forgive me, but this argument 
smacks of the claim that the President is a monarch, while it ignores 
the fact that even monarchs could not serve simultaneously in the leg-
islature.  The Constitution repeatedly refers to the presidency as an 
“office,” and it describes him as an “officer” of the “Government of 
the United States.”  Nowhere, however, does the Constitution call the 
President a “Chief Magistrate” or a “trustee.”  The framers may or may 
not have thought of him that way, but what counts in constitutional 
law is what they said in the text and not what they thought.  They said 
he held an office and that he was an officer of the Government of the 
United States and that is all we need to know to settle this matter. 
Tillman notes that the Constitution did describe the Speaker of 
the House as an officer, and yet the Incompatibility Clause has never 
been thought to preclude members of Congress from serving as 
Speakers, committee chairs, or legislative officers.  That is true, but 
the Constitution specifically says the House and Senate shall “chuse” 
“the Speaker and their other officers.”  Speakers and Committee Chairs 
are thus not officers of the United States but are only officers of the 
House of Representatives or the Senate.  Surely Tillman would not 
confound the United States with the House or the Senate!  Moreover, 
the fact is that there was a long tradition in 1787 of members of Par-
liament serving simultaneously as Speaker, while there was no tradi-
tion at all of members of Parliament simultaneously being Monarchs.  
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Such traditions counsel in favor of reading the phrase “office under 
the United States” as including the President while excluding officers 
who are officers only of the House or of the Senate. 
Tillman objects that the President is not an “officer of the United 
States” for purposes of the Appointments, Impeachments, or Commis-
sions Clauses, and he therefore claims he cannot be said to hold “any 
Office under the United States.”  Both phrases according to Tillman 
must be synonymous.  To begin with, this simply is not true.  The 
phrase “any Office under the United States” is potentially broader 
than the phrase “officer of the United States” both because it uses the 
word “any” and because the word “under” could be broader than “of.” 
Moreover, most readers of ordinary English in 1787 would likely 
have thought that the phrase “officer” of the “Government of the 
United States” in the Necessary and Proper Clause and the phrase “of-
ficer of the United States” in the Appointment Clause meant the same 
thing.  The phrases are simply too similar to permit different mean-
ings, and Tillman provides no evidence whatsoever of such different 
meanings.  Ordinary speakers of English might have thought the 
President was an officer whose appointment was “herein otherwise 
provided for” because he is selected by the Electoral College and be-
cause the word “herein” refers to the rest of the whole Constitution 
here as it obviously does in the Vesting Clause of Article I.  See U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be 
vested in a Congress of the United States . . . .”).  Tillman’s inability to 
differentiate the Necessary and Proper Clause is thus fatal to his thesis.  
Congress has enacted lots of legislation over two centuries predicated 
on the idea that it can carry into execution the President’s executive 
power because he is an “officer” of “the Government of the United 
States.” 
This brings us back to the Impeachment Clause which says that 
“[t]he President, Vice President, and all civil Officers of the United 
States” are liable to removal by impeachment.  Tillman claims it is 
portentous that this clause lists the President and Vice President sepa-
rately from “all civil officers of the United States,” and he notes that 
the word “other” appeared between “all” and “civil” in early drafts of 
the Constitution and was deliberately omitted from the final text.  
With all due respect, Tillman here has made a mountain out of a 
molehill.  The reason the Impeachment Clause separately refers to 
the President and the Vice President is not because the framers did 
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not think they were civil officers of the United States, but is rather be-
cause the framers wanted to be clear that Presidents and Vice Presi-
dents, unlike Kings and Queens, were impeachable.  In England, this 
had not been the case, and since the framers were departing here 
from the English practice, they thought they needed to be especially 
clear about what they were doing lest they be misunderstood. 
The omission of the word “other” in the Constitution’s secret 
drafting history counts for nothing to original-meaning textualists and 
in any event is explained on the ground that use of the word here was 
redundant.  The lesson of the Impeachment Clause is that when the 
framers departed from English practice, they were really clear that 
that was what they were doing.  This point obviously harms Tillman’s 
thesis since there was no English practice of Kings or Queens serving 
as members of Parliament.  Moreover, the Impeachment Clause reaf-
firms that the President and Vice President are civil officers “under” 
and not “over” the United States because, unlike Kings and Queens, 
they are impeachable.  The Clause thus hurts Tillman’s case more 
than it helps it. 
That leaves us with Tillman’s argument about the Commissions 
Clause, where, as I conceded in my Opening Statement, he has a valid 
point.  The Commissions Clause commands that the President must 
commission all the officers of the United States, and yet no President 
has commissioned himself, his successor, or his Vice President.  Thus, 
Tillman has an argument from practice that Presidents and Vice Presi-
dents either have not been regarded as being officers of the United 
States or at least that the question has been embarrassingly over-
looked. 
Several points deserve recognition in response here.  First, even if 
Tillman were right that Presidents and Vice Presidents were not “offi-
cers of the United States” it would not necessarily follow that the 
presidency is not included by the different words “any Office under 
the United States.”  The latter phrase again is arguably broader than is 
the former.  “Any office” means any office, and the Constitution is as 
plain as day when it says that the presidency is an office, as Tillman 
himself concedes. 
Moreover, Tillman’s argument about practice under the Commis-
sions Clause runs smack into a counterargument about practice under 
the Necessary and Proper Clause whereby Congress has treated the 
President as if he is an “officer” of the “Government of the United 
States” in many statutes, including the Impoundment Control Act and 
the War Powers Resolution.  It is obvious that individuals and busi-
nesses have relied far more on the practice under the Necessary and 
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Proper Clause than they have on the clerical practice under the 
Commissions Clause.  Thus, if it is practice since the framing that 
counts in constitutional law, I win hands down. 
Tillman, however, seems to think Washington’s practice of not 
commissioning himself, his successor, or his Vice President is some 
kind of postenactment legislative history that suggests Washington 
made a considered judgment that Presidents were really more like 
Kings and Queens than they were holders of “any Office under the 
United States.”  There is no evidence, however, that Washington ever 
thought about the matter one way or the other or that even if he did, 
he interpreted the Commissions Clause correctly.  Washington was fal-
lible and made plenty of mistakes, and this was one of them. 
Arguments from the original meaning of the constitutional text 
and from two centuries of American practice and eight hundred years 
of English practice suggest that there is no support for dual presiden-
tial and congressional office-holding.  These arguments are bolstered 
by normative concerns.  There is an obvious conflict of interest when 
a President claims simultaneously to represent the whole nation and 
the people of Illinois.  To put it mildly, the national interest may often 
conflict with the interests of voters in a particular state or congres-
sional district.  A President who is also a representative or a senator 
will be paid in part to represent a congressional district or a state and 
that may influence him in serving the nation as a whole.  If it does not 
influence him, then he might give short shrift to the interests of the 
state or district he is representing.  The conflict of interest created by 
dual presidential and congressional office-holding might be tolerable 
if the Constitution clearly commanded it, but the reality is the oppo-
site.  Faced with such a situation, a constitutional interpreter is enti-
tled to presume that the framers meant to do the right thing, norma-
tively, rather than that they meant to create a bizarre conflict of 
interest—a conflict of interest unprecedented in the last eight hun-
dred years. 
There is one strong argument for Tillman’s position which he 
does not make, and that is an argument from the original intentions 
of the framers rather than from the original public meaning of the 
text they wrote.  The framers intended the Incompatibility Clause to 
prevent Presidents from bribing members of Congress by offering 
them lucrative public offices.  They may very well have never thought 
about the possibility of the clause applying to the President himself.  
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All of this is true, but it is utterly beside the point, because what mat-
ters is not what the framers intended, but what was the original public 
meaning of the text that they wrote and the people ratified.  The text 
forbids members of Congress from holding “any Office under the 
United States.”  The presidency is plainly such an office.  And that is 
the beginning and the end of constitutional inquiry. 
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